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Fracture Critical Members
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• FCM: Non-redundant steel tension member (or member’s component)
• Non-redundant: member failure (typically a fracture) leads to collapse or renders
structure non-usable.
• Steel tension: only applies to steel in tension:
• Same member, made of reinforced concrete is not considered “critical” even if it is nonredundant.
• A non-redundant compression member is not considered “critical”.

• Member or member’s component:
• Member: tie, chord, diagonal, hanger, etc.
• Members’ component: tension flanges in girders and beams.

• All FCMs must be subjected to FCM inspection every 24 months (NBIS).
• New FCMs must meet AASHTO/AWS D1.5 Sec. 12 – Fracture Control Plan.
We Make a Difference
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• 2012 FHWA Memo: Clarification of Requirements for FCMs:
•
•
•
•

Reminder of inspection and fabrication requirements
Introduces the definition of SRM
Acknowledges that refined analysis is needed, but there a no codified criteria
“For design and fabrication, only Load Path Redundancy may be considered. For inservice inspection protocol, Structural Redundancy demonstrated by refined
analysis is now formally recognized and may also be considered. Internal member
redundancy is currently not recognized in the classification of Fracture Critical
Members for either design and fabrication or in-service inspection. Finally, this
memo introduces a new member classification, a System Redundant Member
(SRM), which is a non-load-path-redundant member that gains its redundancy by
system behavior.”
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• System: The BRIDGE is redundant against failure of ENTIRE MEMBER
• Example: full-section fracture of a girder, although only one flange is in tension.

• Internal: The MEMBER is redundant against failure of a COMPONENT
• Only applies to bolted components
• Example: fracture of a web plate in a bolted built-up tension chord

• System redundancy can be used to change FCM designation
• Internal redundancy canNOT be used to change FCM designation:
• This policy might change in the near future

We Make a Difference
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• “System Redundant Member (SRM): A steel primary member or portion
thereof subject to tension for which the redundancy is not known by
engineering judgement, but which is demonstrated to have redundancy
through a refined analysis. SRMs must be identified and designated as
such by the Engineer on the contract plans, and designated in the contract
to be fabricated according to Clause 12 of the AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5
Bridge Welding Code. An SRM need not be subject to the hands-on inservice inspection protocol for an FCM as described in 23 CFR 650.”
• From AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, 9th ed.
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• “System Redundant Member (SRM): A steel primary member or portion
thereof subject to tension for which the redundancy is not known by
engineering judgement, but which is demonstrated to have redundancy
through a refined analysis. SRMs must be identified and designated as
such by the Engineer on the contract plans, and designated in the contract
to be fabricated according to Clause 12 of the AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5
Bridge Welding Code. An SRM need not be subject to the hands-on inservice inspection protocol for an FCM as described in 23 CFR 650.”

• If no refined analysis is performed, it would be FCM:
•

Steel tension member “traditionally” considered non-redundant

• If refined analysis shows redundancy, it is SRM
We Make a Difference
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• “System Redundant Member (SRM): A steel primary member or portion
thereof subject to tension for which the redundancy is not known by
engineering judgement, but which is demonstrated to have redundancy
through a refined analysis. SRMs must be identified and designated as
such by the Engineer on the contract plans, and designated in the contract
to be fabricated according to Clause 12 of the AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5
Bridge Welding Code. An SRM need not be subject to the hands-on inservice inspection protocol for an FCM as described in 23 CFR 650.”

• SRMs need to meet FABRICATION requirements of FCMs
We Make a Difference
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• “System Redundant Member (SRM): A steel primary member or portion
thereof subject to tension for which the redundancy is not known by
engineering judgement, but which is demonstrated to have redundancy
through a refined analysis. SRMs must be identified and designated as
such by the Engineer on the contract plans, and designated in the contract
to be fabricated according to Clause 12 of the AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5
Bridge Welding Code. An SRM need not be subject to the hands-on inservice inspection protocol for an FCM as described in 23 CFR 650.”

• SRMs do NOT need to meet INSPECTION requirements of FCMs
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• NCHRP Project 12-87A and NCHRP Report 883:
•
•
•
•

Development of a refined analysis methodology for SRMs
Load combinations
Analysis requirements
Performance criteria in the faulted state

• AASHTO Guide Specs. for Analysis and Identification of FCMs and SRMs:
• SRM Guide Spec

• WisDOT applied the SRM Guide Spec to several twin tub girders
• Over 20 twin tub girder bridges were taken off the FCM inspection list
• Led to the development of simplified analysis procedures that do not need FEA
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Redundancy Research and Analysis
• NCHRP Project 12-87A and NCHRP
Report 883:
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NCHRP

• Development of a refined analysis
methodology for SRMs
• Load combinations
• Analysis requirements
• Performance criteria in the faulted
state

• AASHTO Guide Specs
• WisDOT applied the SRM Guide
Spec to several twin tub girders

Michael Baker

RESEARCH REPORT 883

Ffacture-Critical System
Analysis for Steel Bridges

..-·-
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........£:2'-In addttion to the NCHRP Research Re11ort 883, a number of deliverables provided as appendices bellow:
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Redundancy Research and Analysis
• NCHRP Project 12-87A and NCHRP
Report 883
• AASHTO Guide Specs. for Analysis
and Identification of FCMs and
SRMs:
• SRM Guide Spec

• WisDOT application of the SRM
Guide Spec
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• SRM Guide Spec:
• Screening
• FEA Methodology
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Software requirements
Analysis procedures
Failure scenarios
Load combinations

FE Modeling guidance
Performance criteria in the faulted state
Detailing requirements for new SRMs
Simplified provisions for twin-tub girder bridges to be appended in the next edition
• Based on application of the SRM Guide Spec by WisDOT
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Redundancy Research and Analysis
• NCHRP Project 12-87A and NCHRP
Report 883
• AASHTO Guide Specs.
• WisDOT applied the SRM Guide
Spec to several twin tub girders
• Over 20 twin tub girder bridges were
taken off the FCM inspection list
• Led to the development of simplified
analysis procedures that do not need
FEA
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• WisDOT contacted the authors of NCHRP 883 to apply SRM Spec
• Twin tub girder bridges, tension portions of bottom flanges are FCMs
• Over 20 bridges are now off the FCM inspection list
• Not all bridges analysis were taken off the FCM inspection list

• Simplified analytical procedures were developed based on the analysis for WisDOT

• WisDOT contacted Michael Baker International to develop retrofits for
structures that fail advanced and simplified analysis.
• Three structures were selected for evaluation
• B-30-030
• B-32-202
• B-40-583
We Make a Difference
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Background on Analyzed Structures
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• B-30-030
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three-span twin-tub girder bridge
County Highway ML over I-41/I-94
Bristol, Kenosha County, WI
Built in 2003, meets FCP
Straight with slight skew
Shallow girders:
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• Bottom flange is 114”
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• Out-to-out and girder spacing are typical:
• Out-to-out is 40.8’
• Girder spacing is 22.6’
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Background on Analyzed Structures
• B-30-030:
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• Does not meet simplified analysis:
•
•
•
•
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Girder depth is less than 60 in.
No full-depth full-width diaphragms
No shear studs over piers (neg. moment)
One end span is less than 100 ft.
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• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Intermediate external bracing buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking
• Bottom flange buckling
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Background on Analyzed Structures
• B-30-030:
• Does not meet simplified analysis:
•
•
•
•

Girder depth is less than 60 in.
No full-depth full-width diaphragms
No shear studs over piers (neg. moment)
One end span is less than 100 ft.

• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Intermediate external bracing buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking
• Bottom flange buckling
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• B-32-202 Unit 3
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three-span twin-tub girder bridge
US 14 and US 61 over the Mississippi River
La Crosse, La Crosse County, WI
Built in 2004, meets FCP
Curved (1400’ radius) with no skew
Well-proportioned girders:
• Girder depth is 110”
• Bottom flange is 114”

• Out-to-out and girder spacing are typical:
• Out-to-out is 44.9’
• Girder spacing is 25.0’
We Make a Difference
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• B-32-202 Unit 3
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three-span twin-tub girder bridge
US 14 and US 61 over the Mississippi River
La Crosse, La Crosse County, WI
Built in 2004, meets FCP
Curved (1400’ radius) with no skew
Well-proportioned girders:
• Girder depth is 110”
• Bottom flange is 114”

• Out-to-out and girder spacing are typical:
• Out-to-out is 44.9’
• Girder spacing is 25.0’
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• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Does not meet simplified analysis:
• No intermediate diaphragms at all
• End spans are longer than 200 ft.
• Web depth larger than 90 in.

• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Cross-frame buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking
• Bottom flange buckling
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• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Does not meet simplified analysis:
• No intermediate diaphragms at all
• End spans are longer than 200 ft.
• Web depth larger than 90 in.

• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Cross-frame buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking
• Bottom flange buckling
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• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Does not meet simplified analysis:
• No intermediate diaphragms at all
• End spans are longer than 200’

• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Cross-frame buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking
• Bottom flange buckling
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• B-40-853
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three-span twin-tub girder bridge
Ramp from I-41 SB to I-94 EB (Zoo Interchange)
Milwaukee, WI
Built in 2017, meets FCP
Curved (840’ radius) with no skew
Well-proportioned girders:
• Girder depth is 84”
• Bottom flange is 114”

• Out-to-out and girder spacing are typical:
• Out-to-out is 44.9’
• Girder spacing is 23.0’
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Background on Analyzed Structures
• B-40-853:
• Does not meet simplified analysis:
• End span longer than 200 ft.

• Failure mechanism from advanced analysis:
• Fractured girder bottom flange buckling
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Background on Analyzed Structures
• B-40-853:
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• Does not meet simplified analysis:
• Span length ratio
• Fractured girder bottom flange buckling
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• Main objective is to assess if retrofits for redundancy are feasible
• Allows for a more conservative approach
• Need to capture failure mechanisms

• Secondary objective is to develop preliminary retrofits
• What characteristics of the simplified analysis can be targeted?
•
•
•
•

Span lengths, girder proportions, etc. cannot be changed
Additional full-depth composite diaphragms
Bottom flange stiffening
Cover plates

• Perform redundancy evaluations of the retrofitted bridges
• Preliminary costs estimates

We Make a Difference
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• More conservative approach with respect to SRM Guide Spec.:
• Why do we need a different approach?
• Analysis tool (Midas Civil) limitations
• Convergence issues when non-linear material models or softening are used

• Need for quicker analysis for retrofit development process
• Multiple analyses need to be run to assess each retrofit idea
• No computational nodes/supercomputers/community clusters

• Approach is limited to elastic range of material behavior
• Non-linear material models or element softening are not included in the model

• Rest of approach follows SRM Guide Spec
• Minimum failure scenarios
• Load combinations
• Meshing requirements, etc.
We Make a Difference
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• How to handle non-linear material behavior?
• Stresses in steel are kept within elastic range
• Average stress in a component is limited to yield strength
• Occasional hotspots (e.g.: at the stiffener locations) are allowed

• Shear stud axial softening is not modeled
• Shear behavior of shear studs is modeled as in the SRM Guide Spec
• Axial stiffness of shear stud is included in the model
• Failure assumed after peak axial loads is reached, shear stud is removed

• Deck damage is manually implemented
• Deck reinforcement is not explicitly modeled
• Elements exceeding cracking moment or rupture modulus are softened to cracked stiffness
• Failure when element reaches nominal flexural capacity or nominal compressive strength

We Make a Difference
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Shear Stud Tension Behavior
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• How to handle non-linear material behavior?
• Stresses in steel are kept within elastic range
• Average stress in a component is limited to yield strength
• Occasional hotspots (e.g.: at the stiffener locations) are allowed

• Shear stud axial softening is not modeled
• Shear behavior of shear studs is modeled as in the SRM Guide Spec
• Axial stiffness of shear stud is included in the model
• Failure assumed after peak axial loads is reached, shear stud is removed

• Deck damage is manually implemented
• Deck reinforcement is not explicitly modeled
• Elements exceeding cracking moment or rupture modulus are softened to cracked stiffness
• Failure when element reaches nominal flexural capacity or nominal compressive strength
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Approach: Non-linear Materials
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• Modeling methodology was a multi-step non-linear elastic analysis:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Steel only
Application of “wet” deck slab loads
Deck slab hardening
Removal of temporary supports
Application of “wet” barrier loads
Barrier load hardening
Application of wearing surface and miscellaneous loads
Application of live loads
• Live load position calculated per moving load analysis in a linear elastic model
• Equivalent static loads were imported into the multi-step model

• Introduction of fracture through element deletion
We Make a Difference
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• Redundancy evaluation requires examining two load combinations:
• Redundancy I: Instant in which the primary steel tension member fails
• Includes dynamic effects due to oscillation of the structure
• Analogous to an Extreme Event II load combination
• ( 1 + 𝐷𝐴𝑅)(1.05 𝐷𝐶 + 1.05 𝐷𝑊 + 0.85 𝐿𝐿)

• Redundancy II: Bridge operation in the faulted state after
• Analogous to a Strength I load combination
• 1.05 𝐷𝐶 + 1.05 𝐷𝑊 + 1.30 ( 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐼𝑀)

• Redundancy evaluation requires examining minimum failure scenarios:
• For twin tub girder bridges only failure in positive flexure are required
• Two bottom flanges, four top flanges

• Failure locations are those most critical to the structure in the faulted condition
• Only failures in the exterior (high beam, larger radius) were examined
We Make a Difference
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Benchmarking Results
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• Failure mechanisms described in previous evaluations were replicated
• Not the entire failure was developed

• B-30-030:
• Intermediate external bracing buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking

• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Cross-frame buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking

• B-40-853:
• Bottom flange buckling
We Make a Difference
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• Failure mechanisms described in previous evaluations were replicated
• Not the entire failure was developed
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• Intermediate external bracing buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking

• B-32-202 Unit 3:
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• Not the entire failure was developed

• B-30-030:
• Intermediate external bracing buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking

• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Cross-frame buckling
• Deck crushing and cracking

• B-40-853:
• Bottom flange buckling
We Make a Difference
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Benchmarking Results
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• Differences in modeling approach led to different results w.r.t. previous
evaluation:
• B-32-202 Unit 3:
• Bottom flange yielding of intact girder
• Took place for Redundancy I load combination
• Redundancy II results only in the previous evaluation

• B-40-853:
• Bottom flange buckling was “NOT” captured for the Redundancy I load combination
in Midas
• It was activated when the additional 15% of live load was applied

We Make a Difference
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Retrofit Development
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• Target the initiation of the failure mechanism
• No need to strengthen the bottom flange over the pier if we can prevent loss of
stiffness near the failure location

• B-30-030 and B-32-202 Unit 3 did not have a diaphragm system sufficiently
stiff:
• Need to add composite full-depth plate diaphragms

• B-32-202 Unit 3 end span did not have sufficient strength in the bottom
flange:
• Need to add cover plates to the bottom flange

• B-40-853 had a bottom flange transition too close to the pier:
• Need to add stiffening to prevent bottom flange buckling
We Make a Difference
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Retrofit Development
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• Target the initiation of the failure mechanism
• No need to strengthen the bottom flange over the pier if we can prevent loss of
stiffness near the failure location

• B-30-030 and B-32-202 Unit 3 did not have a diaphragm system sufficiently
stiff:
• Need to add composite full-depth plate diaphragms

• B-32-202 Unit 3 end span did not have sufficient strength in the bottom
flange:
• Need to add cover plates to the bottom flange

• B-40-853 had a bottom flange transition too close to the pier:
• Need to add stiffening to prevent bottom flange buckling
We Make a Difference
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Retrofit Development
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• Target the initiation of the failure mechanism
• No need to strengthen the bottom flange over the pier if we can prevent loss of
stiffness near the failure location

• B-30-030 and B-32-202 Unit 3 did not have a stiff diaphragm system:
• Need to add composite full-depth plate diaphragms

• B-32-202 Unit 3 end span did not have sufficient strength in the bottom
flange:
• Need to add cover plates to the bottom flange

• B-40-853 had a bottom flange transition too close to the pier:
• Need to add stiffening to prevent bottom flange buckling

We Make a Difference
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Proposed Retrofits
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Bridge

Recommended Retrofits

B-30-30

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 2 end spans (spans 1 & 3)
2 diaphragms x 1 interior span (span 2)
= 12 total diaphragms

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
2 diaphragms x 3 interior spans (spans 2, 3 & 7)
=26 total diaphragms

B-32-202

B-40-853
We Make a Difference

Estimated Quantity

Bottom cover plates
(~60” wide x 125’ long)

2 tub girders x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
= 8 total cover plates

Bottom flange stiffeners
(~ 35’ long)

2 tub girder x 2 long end spans (spans 1 & 6)
= 4 total flange stiffening locations
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Proposed Retrofits: B-30-030
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NEW PLATE DIAPHRAGMS
AND INTERNAL BRACING
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Bridge

Recommended Retrofits

B-30-30

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 2 end spans (spans 1 & 3)
2 diaphragms x 1 interior span (span 2)
= 12 total diaphragms

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
2 diaphragms x 3 interior spans (spans 2, 3 & 7)
=26 total diaphragms

B-32-202

B-40-853
We Make a Difference

Estimated Quantity

Bottom cover plates
(~60” wide x 125’ long)

2 tub girders x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
= 8 total cover plates

Bottom flange stiffeners
(~ 35’ long)

2 tub girder x 2 long end spans (spans 1 & 6)
= 4 total flange stiffening locations
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Proposed Retrofits: B-32-202 Unit 3
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Proposed Retrofits
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Bridge

Recommended Retrofits

B-30-30

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 2 end spans (spans 1 & 3)
2 diaphragms x 1 interior span (span 2)
= 12 total diaphragms

Intermediate plate diaphragms,
composite with the deck

5 diaphragms x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
2 diaphragms x 3 interior spans (spans 2, 3 & 7)
=26 total diaphragms

B-32-202

B-40-853
We Make a Difference

Estimated Quantity

Bottom cover plates
(~60” wide x 125’ long)

2 tub girders x 4 end spans (spans 1, 4, 6 & 8)
= 8 total cover plates

Bottom flange stiffeners
(~ 35’ long)

2 tub girder x 2 long end spans (spans 1 & 6)
= 4 total flange stiffening locations
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Proposed Retrofits: B-32-202
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Retrofit Evaluation Results
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• For all three structures the retrofits were able to:
• Keep the tub girder stresses under yield
• Minimize concrete deck slab damage and prevent deck failure
• Cracking moment of the slab is exceeded in the failure location
• Deck flexural capacity or nominal compressive strength are not exceeded
• Top of barrier may experience compressive damage

•
•
•
•
•

Shear stud axial failure was contained by the intermediate diaphragms
Vertical deflections due to dead load were below L/50 (limit in SRM Guide Spec)
Cross-slope changes were kept below 5% (limit in SRM Guide Spec)
No uplift at end supports
Structure was able to support an additional 15% of live load
• We are still in the ascending branch of the load deflection curve

We Make a Difference
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Retrofits Cost Estimates
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Bridge

Recommended Retrofits

Estimated Cost

B-30-30

12 intermediate plate diaphragms, composite
with the deck

$1,100,000 to $1,600,000

B-32-202

26 intermediate plate diaphragms, composite
with the deck

$5,700,000 to $7,800,000

8 bottom cover plates
(~60” wide x 125’ long)
B-40-853
We Make a Difference

4 bottom flange stiffeners
(~ 35’ long)
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$240,000 to $340,000

Progress to Date and Future Work

Michael Baker
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• WisDOT submitted report to FHWA seeking FCM inspection alleviation if
the retrofits were made.
• FHWA approved the preliminary retrofits.
• WisDOT’s Central Office is currently working with the Regional Offices
• Retrofits for B-40-853 are very likely to occur

• Once final design is approved Michael Baker International is expected to:
• Finalize retrofit design (and optimize if necessary)
• Develop construction plans and
• Provide additional analytical support in case that:
• FHWA request additional evidence for re-designation to SRM
• Final retrofits differ from preliminary ones
We Make a Difference
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Conclusion
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• Application of SRM Guide Specs is not limited to evaluation
• Can be used to develop retrofits if the initial analysis does not show redundancy

• Application of SRM Guide Specs is complex but a simplified conservative
approach might be taken to develop preliminary retrofits
• Particularly if a previous evaluation was conducted per strict application for the
SRM Guide Specs

• Target the initial failure mechanism to develop retrofit
• Do not need to address subsequent mechanism if they do not get activated

• Initial failure mechanism is the primary driver of retrofit costs
• Composite plate diaphragms versus longitudinal stiffener

We Make a Difference
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Benefits
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• Why develop retrofit for a structure that does not have any damage/rates
well/no corrosion?
• Fracture Critical Member Inspection:
• Expensive: Hands-on, confined access.
• Risks to inspectors and the public: Much longer than a routine inspection.
• Can be unreliable: Looking for indications of future fracture, i.e.: CRACKS

We Make a Difference
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• Why develop retrofit for a structure that does not have any damage/rates
well/no corrosion?
• Fracture Critical Member Inspection:
1. Expensive: Hands-on, confined access, etc. every 24 months
2. Risks to inspectors and the public: Much longer than a routine inspection.
3. Can be unreliable: Looking for indications of future fracture, i.e.: CRACKS

• Re-designation to System Redundant Member addresses this concerns:
1. One-time cost of the retrofit vs. life-cycle cost of FCM inspection
2. Without FCM inspection the risks to the inspectors and public are minimized
3. Reliability accomplished through design for failure
• Redundancy, fail-safe design, fault tolerance, contingency plans are used in other industries
We Make a Difference
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• Why develop retrofit for a structure that does not have any damage/rates
well/no corrosion?
• Fracture Critical Member Inspection:
1. Expensive: Hands-on, confined access, etc. every 24 months
2. Risks to inspectors and the public: Much longer than a routine inspection.
3. Can be unreliable: Looking for indications of future fracture, i.e.: CRACKS

• Re-designation to System Redundant Member addresses this concerns:
1. One-time cost of the retrofit vs. life-cycle cost of FCM inspection
2. Without FCM inspection the risks to the inspectors and public are minimized
3. RELIABILITY ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH DESIGN FOR FAILURE
• Redundancy, fail-safe design, fault tolerance, contingency plans are used in other industries
We Make a Difference
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Thanks for your attention.
Questions?

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

65

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

66

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

67

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

68

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

69

Michael Baker
INTERNATIONAL

We Make a Difference

70

71

